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Executive Summary 
This study identifies the main current vulnerabilities of local and regional 
authorities (LRAs) in Southern Mediterranean countries regarding public 
procurement and public services, and provides a systematic assessment of 
priority avenues of intervention. In a context of a moderately low institutional 
capacity, and of a yet incipient process of decentralisation, corruption can 
severely impede the delivering good quality public goods and services at 
subnational level. 
Key findings suggest that the main concern with regards to corruption at 
subnational level in the region is that of favouritism in public procurement 
procedures; various public contracts and concessions are granted to politically 
connected contractors. The only country where this does not seem to be a major 
concern is Jordan. The second main concern is nepotism in public 
appointments. Both forms of corruption create distrust amongst citizens, and 
decrease the quality of public goods and services provided. Across countries, 
we found that experts’ assessment place political will to counter corruption to 
be much higher at central than local government level, as is the institutional 
capacity to do so. However, two countries deviate from this trend, in both 
Tunisia and Turkey there seems to be significant bottom-up pressures to 
countering corruption. In Tunisia, the main drivers seem to be the branches of 
civil society groups that are active at community level, while in Turkey local 
and regional authorities seem to be more involved in anticorruption actions than 
the central government.  
Recommendations formulated in this report build upon expert suggestions, as 
well as our own mapping of good practices at LRA level. Increasing the 
capacity of local and regional authorities in this region will involve a 
simultaneous process of (1) strengthening their ties to local communities—by 
increasing both their functioning attributions (i.e. obligation to distribute goods 
and services), as well as their financial base (i.e. ability to distribute goods and 
services), while (2) constructing checks and balances to promote ethical 
behaviour.  
On the first issue, decentralisation is important in this region because it can 
address the issue of large-scale distrust in the government. With local level 
empowerment, citizens can become involved in the deliberative processes, 
while public officials can be held accountable for the end results and benefits of 
their actions. Steps have been taken in this direction in Jordan, or Egypt through 
recent legislative reforms, but it is yet to be seen how they will take shape in 
real institutional transfer of powers. On the second issue, there is a variety of 
measures designed to promote ethical behaviour at LRA level, both 
preventive—increasing transparency, digitalising suitable public services (e.g. 
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permits, licences, paying taxes) so as to reduce discretionary access, and 
corrective—addressing complaints, protecting whistle blowers, sanctioning 
improprieties in selection of offers and granting of contracts and concessions.  
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Introduction: Methodology and Scope of Investigation 
Conceptual Framework 
Corruption is a broad term that has started to represent so many different 
informal linkages entertained by public officials that it becomes very hard to 
identify potential solutions without disentangling its different facets.  
One of the most widespread definitions is that corruption means the abuse of 
public office for private gain. However, the form and purpose of this “abuse” is 
important in defining competent counter-measures. Furthermore, the present 
study evaluates the underpinning mechanisms that support different forms of 
corruption. Recent studies reveal the conceptual distinctions between: 
clientelism—taken to mean the exchange of goods and services for electoral 
support1, and patronage or nepotism—taken to mean preferential appointments 
in public institutions2 and/or preferential contract allocation to friends and 
family beneficiaries. Overall, the distortive phenome that substitute informal 
linkages to formal ones lead to state capture—taken to mean discretionary 
control over public resources (e.g. public funds, goods, jobs, or administrative 
decisions)3. 
Beyond understanding the different mechanisms involved in corrupt behavior, it 
is also important to understand the different impact of the varieties of 
corruption. Firstly, clientelism is correlated to electoral goals, as public goods 
and services are exchanged for political support. This, in turn, consolidates the 
position of the incumbents, distorting the political competition. It increases both 
the need and opportunity for other practices such as nepotism or favoritism in 
public procurement in order to further consolidate the patrons’ discretionary 
control over institutional resources. Finally, the lack of transparency or 
whistle blowers protection are all additional facilitators of misconduct as they 
diminish monitoring capacity of any third party.  
We incorporated all these different varieties of corruption that can be frequently 
found in local and regional governments in the expert survey we deployed on 
selected case study countries.  
Beyond the occurrence of corruption, analysts and policy-makers must always 
be weary of isolating the phenomena from the issue of institutional capacity. As 
such, to the best of our ability, we tried to assess not only the incidence of 
corruption at local level in the Euro-Mediterranean countries, but also the 
                                           
1 Volintiru, C. (2017). A new model of clientelism: political parties, public resources, and private contributors. 
European Political Science Review, 9(1), 115-137. 
2 Volintiru, C. (2015). The exploitative function of party patronage: does it serve the party's interest? East 
European Politics, 31(1), 39-55. 
3 Volintiru, C., Trandafir, G., Toma, B., Nuțu, O și Damian, A. (2018) Report “State-Owned Companies: 
Preventing Corruption, Clientelism and State Capture” Project, www.statecapture.eu, last accessed on 
07.06.2018.  
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drivers and impediments to institutional capacity at local and regional level. 
Generally, there are two factors, across countries, and across institutional 
cultures, that tend to link poor or discretionary delivery of public goods and 
services with corruption. On one hand, there is an inherent tension between 
public duties and the pursuit of electoral survival. Short-term goals of winning 
elections are often better suited by clientelistic distribution of resources. At the 
same time, appointed positions or delegated mandates from the central 
government have a higher likelihood of engaging in nepotism and opaque 
administrative conduct, as they are not conditioned by popular support directly. 
On the other hand, many local and regional level well-trained professionals end 
up working for the central administration. Whatever cadres political parties 
have are absorbed by the central government, where positions are more 
prestigious and the pay is higher. As such, at local and regional level it is often 
that we have troubles discerning instances of corruption from those driven by 
incompetence.  
Selection of Cases  
Out of the total sample of cases in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the ranking 
of Freedom House in terms of quality of democracy differ greatly4. From the 
region, only Israel and Tunisia are evaluated as free democracies. Albania 
(68/100), Bosnia and Herzegovina (55/100), Lebanon (43/100), Morocco 
(39/100), and Jordan (37/100) all receive the label of partly free democracies. In 
contrast, Algeria, Turkey, Mauritania, Egypt and Palestinian Authority are all 
considered not to be free democracies. We wanted to have a contrasting sample, 
both in terms of regional placement, and in terms of administrative specificities 
in various types of democracies. While a free democracy is generally a 
propitious environment for transparent and accountable institutions, this is not 
always the case. In Jordan for example, there are various checks and balances in 
place aimed at preventing corruption and enhancing accountability, even if its 
democracy scores are low. As such, we selected two free democracies (Israel 
and Tunisia), two partly free democracies from Southern Mediterranean (Jordan 
and Morocco), two partly free democracies from Northern Mediterranean 
(Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina5), and two countries that are labeled as 
not being free democracies (Turkey and Egypt). As such, we are able to identify 
overarching challenges in the wider Euro-Mediterranean area. 
Data Collection 
We used an expert survey methodology that involved collecting via an online 
questionnaire information from 11 topical questions and 3 personal details 
                                           
4 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018, last accessed on 07.06.2018.  
5 While we have collected comparative data for both Albania and Bosnia and Hertzegovina, we have only 
included a single in-depth case study for Albania, as these two countries fall outside the primary regional focus 
of this report.  
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questions. For Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon we used French in the survey, 
invitations and other communications. For the rest of the countries in this study 
we used English. Our respondancy rate may have been partially affected by the 
fact that, due to the time constraints of the project, we did not translate in 
national languages the survey. The sample for the expert survey was constructed 
in the course of this project and relied on existing expert data such as those from 
University of Pennsylvania’s Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program or from 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In addition to 
this, we conducted a systematic coverage of relevant experts in each country 
through online institutional pages and media sources. Finally, we employed 
extensively the snowballing technique and expert recommendations. Overall, 
we collected 122 questionnaires out of a total of 442 opened invitations. The 
sample of targeted experts to which the invitation was disseminated was 
significantly larger, but we do not count bounced or repeatedly unresponsive 
email addresses. 
We also conducted a series of 11 in-depth interviews with high profile scholars 
and regional experts from international organizations6. The aim of these 
interviews was to assess the overarching challenges for building institutional 
capacity at subnational level in the South Mediterranean countries and the EU 
periphery in general.  
We also conducted a systematic assessment of press coverage in each of the 
main outlets in the selected case studies, and accounted for relevant coverage on 
social media networks. Other data sources consulted were reports from 
prestigious international organizations, and survey data from other projects.  
For each country, we aimed to assess the main problems that affect LRAs from 
the point of view of institutional capacity and ethical conduct. With regards to 
unethical conduct, we distinguished between issues related to public 
procurement and those related to public service provision. Finally, we evaluated 
the main measures deployed in preventing and countering corruption—
legislative reforms, institutional bodies and other measures streaming from 
public sector, or civil society initiatives.  
                                           
6 We are extremely grateful for the time, availability and generous exchange of ideas provided by Anwar Shah 
(World Bank), Cristina Corduneanu-Huci (CEU), Gary Marks (EUI), Andrea Teti (University of Aberdeen), 
Neil Ketchley (Kings College), Gary Marks (EUI), Maksym Ivanyna (Joint Vienna Institute), Rana Khazbak 
(LSE) and others who wished to remain anonymous.  
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Prevalence of Corruption at the Local and Regional Level in 
Southern Mediterranean Countries: Country Assessments 
[Morocco] 
Most efforts to fight corruption and promote public ethics in Morocco adopt a 
top down approach. The clientelistic exchanges are arguably well entrenched in 
the Moroccan state, to the extent that the literature often uses the pejorative term 
Makhzen7 as a reflection of a “deep state with hard-to-dismantle roots, 
gravitating around the Sherifian monarchy and including the bureaucracy, the 
army, and the executive”8. However, the majority of the existing clientelistic 
networks in Morocco have been consolidated through historical iterations and 
informal traditions that have also shaped local power dynamics. Experts believe 
the main problems at local and regional level to be: favoritism in public 
procurement and clientelistic distribution of public goods. 
Nepotism is historically rooted in social relations in Morocco. According to the 
ArabTrans Survey, the vast majority of the population believes “wasta”9 to be 
either endemic (51.5%) or frequent (27.8%)10. Popular disenchantment with 
corruption is widespread in Morocco, as protesting against corruption was the 
main reason for participating in the Uprisings11 (57.1%), followed by economic 
grievances (40.3%) and lack of basic services (25.9%), according to a recent 
survey12.  
Roughly, 1 in 2 citizens has paid at least once a bribe to obtain documents or 
permits from public authorities in Morocco13. The main challenge in accessing 
these public services without bribes or connections is the lack of information 
and the complexity of bureaucratic procedures that are very hard to navigate 
without the guidance of a public official.  
Private sector corruption is one of the many facets of informal exchanges in 
Morocco. As a recent study showed private companies can be pressure vehicles 
for good governance in sectors that are not prone to close business-state 
relationsand, as such, have a high rent potential for firms working with the state 
                                           
7 It means “warehouse” but refers to the institution composed of the king and its close entourage. 
8 Corduneanu-Huci, C. (2018). Taming corruption: rent potential, collective action, and taxability in 
Morocco. Business and Politics, 18(3), 297-335. 
9 Here taken to mean: getting a job through political patronage and/or personal connections. In other MENA 
contexts, wasta can refer to any preferential favor granting.    
10 WP6 D6.7: Country Report Morocco (2016); Survey results on political and social change in Morocco, 
[online] http://www.arabtrans.eu/publications-and-reports-/reports/  
11 Protests organised by the 20 February Movement in Morocco in between February 2011 and late spring of 
2012, which are ascribed to the general movement of the Arab Spring. 
12 Idem fn. 9. 
13 Fatafta, M., Rampant Corruption in Arab States, February 21, 2018, Transparency International [online] 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/rampant_corruption_in_arab_states, last accessed on 07.06.2018. 
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(e.g. construction and real estate development)14. The channeling of public 
resources through public procurement to private actors is one of the paramount 
means of ensuring the clientelistic resources required by a local patron15.  
For instance, patronage plays a key role in the context of licenses to mine 
coastal sands. Due to the problematic nature of these exploitations and their 
impact on the environment, the approval for exploitation was often given 
informally without due process and implementation of the relevant legislation16. 
This case shows not only how important wasta is in obtaining permits and 
licenses in Morocco, but also how useful it is to protect some from the 
enforcement of the rules and regulation.   
Public procurement is by all accounts based on wasta and bribes, as 2 in 3 
companies declared in the World Bank Enterprise Survey that they were 
expected to give gifts to secure a government contract.  
Public procurement issues rise up in the case of city lightening (e.g. Rabat), 
parking spaces, landscaping and other public works. Little or no follow-up is 
normally done to public works delivery and the quality of the services provided 
is usually much lower than is to be expected.  
Some of the issues highlighted by experts with regards to LRAs are: obtaining 
permits, obtaining access to public utilities, obtaining commercial licenses, 
cadaster certifications, and technical assessment of automobiles. Exports also 
report the same problem across countries in this region: favoritism in housing 
regulation and enforcement. Various stages of this problem in Moroccan 
bidonvilles, such as issuing a building permit, giving public lodging, or 
evacuating and demolition are all actions that are exerted or not based on 
corrupt exchanges between public officials and the citizens involved.  
According to experts there is a series of large families that control land 
concessions in different Moroccan regions and localities (e.g. Rabat, 
Casablanca).  
Experts judged LRAs in Morocco to have a moderate capacity to perform their 
administrative tasks in a satisfactory manner. Political will to counter corruption 
is judged to be high at all administrative levels, and especially so at national 
level across recent years. In terms of institutional capacity to counter corruption 
we also find a relatively high capacity at central level, and a moderate one at 
regional and local level.  
                                           
14 Corduneanu-Huci, C. (2018). Taming corruption: rent potential, collective action, and taxability in 
Morocco. Business and Politics, 18(3), 297-335. 
15 Gherghina, S., & Volintiru, C. (2017). A new model of clientelism: political parties, public resources, and 
private contributors. European Political Science Review, 9(1), 115-137. 
16 Based on in-depth interview with Cristina Corduneanu-Huci (CEU), 10.05.2018.  
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Corruption prevalence in LRAs in Morocco can be correlated with the pervasive 
lack of resources and low skilled personnel17. 
The relevant anticorruption authority in Morocco is the Central Authority for 
the Prevention of Corruption (ICPC)18. Given the centralised political system of 
Morocco, the powers of the ICPC stream directly from the political will of the 
monarch, and are deployed sooner in a delegated manner than an independent 
institutional body per se.  
Court of Auditors has proven to be a very active agent in recent efforts to 
counter corruption in Morocco, and while its convictions targeted central 
officials19, there could be positive spill-over effects in administrative conduct at 
subnational level.  
Moroccan Government has recently announced its engagement in the revision 
of a number of laws and decrees to increase transparency at all levels20, The 
specific design and implementation of these measures is not clear yet. However, 
the creation of a dedicated Commission last year21  (i.e. National Anti-
Corruption Commission) can be considered as a positive sign. This Commission 
is charged to oversee all legislative and institutional anti-corruption efforts 
aimed at ensuring both prevention and sanctioning. It is comprised of 
representatives from central and regional authorities, as well civil society 
representatives.  
Another method to counter corruption (especially at central level) is the online 
portal for enlisting complaints or claims at various relevant authorities 
(www.maroc.ma), and allows for some degree of participation and easier access 
to information. According to the UN e-Government survey, Morocco scores 
high in the set of cases we analyse here, alongside Israel, Tunisia and Turkey22.  
Since 2011, in Morocco there is a Centre for Legal Assistance for Victims or 
Witnesses of Corruption (Centres d'Assistance et de Conseil Juridique 
(CAJAC)) developed and operated by Transparency Morocco with a grant from 
the Netherlands.  
                                           
17 BTI Morocco 2018, available here: https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/mar/, last 
accessed on 27.05.2018.  
18 Instance Centrale de Prévention de la Corruption http://www.icpc.ma/wps/portal  
19Corruption Crackdown Continues: 18 Officials, 9 Institutions Convicted, March 7, 2018, Morocco World 
News, http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/03/241944/corruption-crackdown-continues-18-officials-9-
institutions-convicted/ , Gendarmerie royale: interpellation de 29 hauts fonctionnaires soupçonnés de corruption 
et de trafic de drogue January 24, 2018, Huffington Post, https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2018/01/24/29-
hauts-fonctionnaires-interpelles_n_19071906.html,  last accessed on 27.05.2018.  
20 Government Crackdown on Corruption, Officials Prosecuted: El Othmani, February 23, Morocco World 
News, http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/02/241196/government-crackdown-corruption-officials-
prosecuted-el-othmani/, last accessed on 28.05.2018. 
21 http://www.maroc.ma/fr/actualites/le-decret-relatif-la-creation-de-la-commission-nationale-de-lutte-contre-la-
corruption , last accessed on 22.05.2018. 
22 https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/Reports/UN-E-Government-Survey-2016, last accessed on 
07.06.2018.   
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[Tunisia] 
While the administrative structures have undergone various reforms over the 
past years, informal exchange networks persist and flourish, mainly due to 
inertias in the every-day practices of numerous civil servants from the old 
regime. Local administrations in rural areas are particularly prone to clientelism 
and nepotism. The political competition that emerged after the Arab Spring 
increased the utility of some clientelistic transactions such as vote-buying. 
Experts pointed to preferential relations between developers of the Sousse 
Mall—advertised to be the largest commercial center in the country, and local 
and regional public officials. In Sfax, there were apparently similar 
wrongdoings between public officials and private contractors involved in 
various ambitious developments with the occasion of the city becoming the 
cultural capital of the Arab world in 2016. However, in this latter case, due to 
more or less well-informed campaign on social media, the projects were 
suspended23.  
In general, there is no follow-up on public works and as such there is usually a 
poor quality delivered on public contracts.  
Public services in Tunisia are frequently exchanged for what is locally called 
bakchich (i.e. bribe). In addition to this, priority is normally granted to relatives 
of public officials. Furthermore, public resources are sometimes subordinated to 
electoral interests, and thus political support to a particular party or candidate 
may increase the chances of obtaining a public contract or better services. All 
this makes access highly discriminatory. 
Obtaining various official documents from local authorities has an informal 
price in Tunisia (i.e. “pourboire”), which can be seen as standardized fee. No 
clear responsibilities in local and regional authorities can be traced with this 
practice, and very stiff and opaque bureaucratic procedures make these informal 
payments ultimately necessary.  
According to the experts we interviewed, the second biggest problem with 
public service delivery in Tunisia is the absence of trained personnel (see Table 
2). The passing of a recent Law on pardoning corrupt public officials that served 
during the old regime24 fuels public disenchantment with regard to the 
development of a meritocratic system of recruitment and evaluation of central 
and local public officials.   
Much like in the case of Egypt, experts report a frequent practice of public 
officials to grant construction permits that are not in conformity with urban 
                                           
23 Sfax Capitale culturelle du Monde arabe: Un projet prometteur est bloqué, Ayda Labassi, November 23, 2016, 
HuffPost Tunisie, [online] https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2016/11/23/renovation-cathedrale-
sfa_n_13148210.html , last accessed on 30.05.2018.  
24 Idem fn. 12. 
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planning or technical safety legislative provisions; when such discretionary 
decisions are not possible and/or courts rule for demolition, the implementation 
of those decisions is stalled in cases of preferential treatment.  
Experts consider Tunisian LRAs to have a moderate capacity to perform their 
administrative tasks in a satisfactory manner. Political will to counter corruption 
is relatively high at national level, but low at local and regional levels. As for 
institutional capacity to counter corruption, experts judge it to be moderate at 
both central and regional level, but very low at local level. In contrast to public 
authorities, civil society and local communities are very much more 
instrumental in countering corruption at local level, leading some of the 
benchmark practices in the region (e.g. participatory budgeting).  
The National Anti-Corruption Agency (INLUCC) has been active in Tunisia 
with both preventive and corrective measure. It has some noticeable elements of 
good practice, such as the online complaint system and Green Line for 
corruption reporting and information. It implements the recently developed 
National Strategy for Good Governance and Fight Against Corruption that had 
an adjacent operational plan for 2017-2018, thus making its action significantly 
more traceable and focused of results. The consolidation of INLUCC and its 
objectives have been helped by the PNUD25 support through the projects of 
Democratic Governance Reinforcement, and has benefitted from exchange of 
good practices with Korean Agency for International Cooperation (KOIC)26. In 
addition to the central level, PNUD funding for Democratic Governance 
Reinforcement in Tunisia has been deployed to municipal beneficiaries thus 
focused specifically on enhancing institutional capacity to counter corruption at 
local level.  
The Right to Information Law was passed in 2016 and a responsible authority 
was created in 2017— Instance nationale d’accès à l’information (INAI). These 
measures contribute significantly to the promotion of transparency on public 
decisions and administrative processes, which in turn diminishes corruption and 
enhances the quality of public services. These too benefitted from technical 
assistance through the Swiss-funded UNESCO project“Support the 
implementation of the RTI law in Tunisia”.27 
A series of reforms were implemented in Tunisia at local government level, as 
part of its National Action Plan elaborated with the Open Government 
Partnership (OGP). As such, with the collaboration of its citizens Sayada 
                                           
25 United Nations Development Programme 
26 2ème session du Congrès National de Lutte Contre la Corruption, December 7, 2017, Realities [online] 
https://www.realites.com.tn/2017/12/2eme-session-congres-national-de-lutte-contre-corruption/, last accessed 
on 30.05.2018.  
27 Support to the implementation on the Tunisian Right to Information law [online] 
https://en.unesco.org/partnerships/foe/right-to-information-tunisia https://www.realites.com.tn/2017/12/2eme-
session-congres-national-de-lutte-contre-corruption/, last accessed on 30.05.2018.  
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became one of the first cities in Tunisia to open its data after 2011; based on a 
civil society initiative, the city now publishes its municipal council meeting 
minutes, key budget data and statistics on a regular basis on a website co-
managed with its partner NGO28. Similarly, participatory budgeting initiatives 
were implemented in La Marsa and Sfax29.  
[Egypt] 
Local governments have long been seen by the public as a hub for corruption in 
Egypt30. Many cases of corruption are attributed to both executive offices and 
representative offices. In the Gharbeya governorate, a director from the housing 
directorate was arrested on charges of accepting bribes from the head of a 
newspaper in the governorate to increase the number of advertisements.31 
Despite recent efforts to reform local governments in Egypt, experts still 
consider abuse of public office and conflict of interests to be the main problems 
of LRAs.  
In 2015, the French company Alstom was sentenced to pay US$772 million in 
fines for breaking the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by granting a total of 
US$75 million in bribes in exchange for US$4 billion contracts in Egypt and 
other countries. Experts point out that contracts for Cairo line 3 were part of the 
corrupt practices of this company and representative of how large public 
procurement contracts in Egyptian municipalities are exchanged for bribes.  
A 2016 report by the Central Auditing Organisation (CAO) claimed that in 
Egypt approx. US$76 billion in had been lost due to corruption in public 
procurement in just three years, but the former head of CAO Hisham Genein 
has been subsequently jailed for spreading false news32. However, experts 
pointed out that the corruption cases in public procurement in local 
governments were true.  
Finally, other issues signalled by experts included cartelisation on the part of 
private contractors, especially in the construction sector, and preferential 
                                           
28 Open Government in La Marsa, Sfax and Sayada, February-March 2017, [online] 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/open-government-in-la-marsa-sfax-and-sayada-020317.pdf, last accessed on 
07.06.2018. 
29 idem fn. 27.  
30 Various press outlets and local surveys covered this issue over the past decade: Ahmed M. Abou Hussein, The 
inevitable struggle: local government in Egypt, Daily News Egypt, October 14, 2012, [online] 
https://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/10/14/the-inevitable-struggle-local-government-in-egypt/, or Rana Khazbak, 
Going Local, Egypt Independent, July 30, 2012, [online]  http://www.egyptindependent.com/going-local/, last 
accessed on 26.05.2018.  
31 ACA arrests government officials on corruption charges, May 25, 2018, Egypt Today, [online] 
https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/50856/ACA-arrests-government-officials-on-corruption-charges , last 
accessed on 27.05.2018. 
32 The Limits of Fighting Corruption in Egypt, Mohamed Abdel Salam, October 13, 2016, SADA, Carnegie 
Endowment, [online] http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/64852, last accessed on 30.05.2018 
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procurement contracts to companies that offer employment for relatives of 
public officials.  
A significant part of public services in Egypt is managed at local level; 
including education, health, water and sanitation, roads and transportation, 
street lighting, and environmental control. However, budgetary allocation 
remains highly centralised. As such, the quality of public service delivery at 
local level is narrowly tied to the relationship of the local or regional 
representative to central decision-makers. This situation is even further 
exacerbated by the dramatic decrease over the past decade of general 
governmental consumption in Egypt, one the lowest in the world judged as % of 
GDP33.  
One of the key objects of corruption at local level in Egypt according to experts 
is the conditional supply of business licences and building permits. The 
numerous cases of apartment building collapsing (e.g. Alexandria) and leaving 
many injured or dead are a testimony of the dramatic consequences of faulty 
procedures if not outright corruption in construction permits.  
Corruption in public services extends to certification of land ownership in 
Egypt. In the governorates of Ismailia and Faiyoum, ACA arrested a director 
and a number of public officials who were charged with misusing their 
positions in order to unlawfully certify the ownership of some citizens’ plots of 
land in exchange for personal benefits or due to personal connections (wasta)34.  
Experts consider LRAs to have a limited or very limited capacity to perform 
their administrative tasks in a satisfactory manner. Political will to counter 
corruption is very low across institutional levels (i.e. national, regional and 
local). As for institutional capacity to counter corruption, it is considered to be 
the highest at central level, significantly diminished at regional and local level.  
Governance at local level is not only affected by the limitation on prerogatives, 
but also by the limitations on legitimacy. Currently in Egypt there is no 
representation system based on popular vote and the checks and balances that 
could uphold the principal- agent relationship at local level are minimal. Local 
Councils that were controlled by Hosni Mubarak’s party were dissolved in 2011 
being considered nests of clientelism. Ever since, their reform and 
reestablishment remains pending. Since early 2012 the Ministry of Local 
Development in Egypt is announcing the imminent development of a new law 
for local administration. This new law is needed both for the configuration of 
executive attributions at local level, as well as for the rehabilitation of Local 
Councils. The budgetary allocations for municipalities for 2018 seem to indicate 
                                           
33 Abbott, P. & Teti, T.(2016) The Political Social and Economic Drivers of the Egyptian Uprising, in WP2 
D2.2: Background Reports; Literature Report for political and social change in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. [online] http://www.arabtrans.eu/publications-and-reports-/reports/  
34 According to expert opinions; details confirmed in press coverage. 
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that this new legislation will be finally developed and implemented shortly, 
likely before the upcoming elections scheduled to take place at the end of 
2018.35  
Opaque regulation in Egypt is perceived by experts as an intentional foundation 
for bribe taking. The legislative ambiguities increase the marginal utility of 
corruption for citizens and economic agents as these become constrained by the 
high information or indirect costs of bureaucratic interaction with the Egyptian 
state, at both local and national level.   
Technical Assistance programs have only limited impact if at all, given that 
they are not internalize in the everyday practices of LRAs. Without this buy in 
of existing administrative bodies, any efforts deployed by international donors 
are futile and leave little behind in terms of palpable results.  
The Administrative Control Authority (ACA) now serves as an independent 
anti-corruption agency that is directly under the Prime Minister’s control. Given 
previous contestation on the grounds of political interferences36, in an effort to 
increase its institutional capacity to fight corruption, ACA has recently signed a 
cooperation agreement with the FBI37. It has made some headway in 
sanctioning corruption at local level over the course of the past years. Still, 
while there are numerous other bodies charged with fighting corruption (i.e. 
Transparency and Integrity Committee, Administrative Control Authority, 
Administrative Prosecution Authority, Illegal Profiting Apparatus) there is little 
evidence of systematic and independent activity. 
A noteworthy initiative in promoting public ethics and good governance at local 
level in Egypt is the establishment of the Local Administration Reform Unit 
(LARU). This Central Government department is meant to further increase 
capacity at local level, by implementing various reform programmes (amongst 
which one the most anticipated is the reform of local councils) and Local 
Economic Development (LED). Still, local authorities in Egypt have little 
experience in adopting such comprehensive strategic planning approach to plan, 
manage, and develop their local economies, as showed in a case study of the 
LED initiative in Fayoum38. Programmes such as the Participatory Development 
Programme in Urban Areas (www.egypt-urban.net ) aim to consolidate local 
                                           
35 https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/49594/Political-parties-prepare-for-local-elections last accessed on 
26.05.2018.  
36 Can the Administrative Control Authority really fight corruption in Egypt?, Mohamed Hamama, September 
12, 2015. [online] https://www.madamasr.com/en/2015/09/12/feature/politics/can-the-administrative-control-
authority-really-fight-corruption-in-egypt/, last accessed on 26.05.2018.   
37 Administrative Control Authority to cooperate with FBI to fight corruption, January 2, 2018, Daily News 
Egypt, [online] https://dailynewsegypt.com/2018/01/02/administrative-control-authority-cooperate-fbi-fight-
corruption/, last accessed on 26.05.2018.  
38 Abozeid, O. (2017). Promoting local economic development in Egypt: Challenges and lessons learned from 
the case of Fayoum governorate. Thesis submitted to American University in Cairo 
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authorities’ capacity to manage more complex processes brought about through 
decentralisation. 
With regards to public procurement contracts, there are some public and private 
initiatives of digitalisation in pursuit of higher transparency. One such example 
is the telephone application ‘Mashro3y’39 launched by the Egyptian think tank 
Egyptian Center for Public Policy Studies (ECPPS). It aims at providing 
information about financial and non-financial service providers to individuals 
wishing to establish an economic activity and already existing entrepreneurs.  
A similar initiative is www.etenders.gov.eg website that announces Egyptian 
Government Tenders and it can validate proposals online.  
Another example, coming from the public sector, is the online platform 
www.egypt.gov.eg meant to serve as a one-stop-ship for e-governance in Egypt. 
It allows citizens to register the information for electricity consumption (and to 
calculate one’s bill), to extract personal documents such as birth certificate, 
divorce marriage or death documents, to pay for telecommunication services, or 
traffic fines. It links to the www.incometax.gov.eg where citizens could pay 
their taxes online. It also links to various other pages that provide information 
and support for individuals (e.g. public job opening) or businesses (e.g. 
registration property process, construction permits). 
 [Jordan] 
Experts consider of prime concern for LRAs in Jordan the abuse of power in 
public office. We also found that there is a general lack of accountability in 
LRAs in Jordan. There are general criticisms to the lack of clarity concerning 
standard operating procedures in the public administration and to an arguably 
inconsistent application of the rule of law. Citizens are most preoccupied with 
the overall lack of transparency.   
The quality of the human resources in LRAs is considered an important 
problem by most experts in Jordan. Beyond corruption, the quality of public 
services in Jordan is affected by insufficient levels of training in the public 
sector. 
Experts consider Jordanian LRAs’ have a moderately low capacity to perform 
their administrative tasks in a satisfactory manner. Political will to counter 
corruption is judged to be high at both central and regional level. Indeed, senior 
public figures, such as the President of the Jordanian Senate, declare the strong 
commitment Jordanian authorities have in countering all forms of corruption in 
                                           
39 http://www.ecpps.org/index.php/en/upcoming-events/1202-in-the-framework-of-“economic-freedom”-
program,-the-egyptian-center-for-public-policy-studies,-in-partnership-with-“seed”-strengthening-
entrepreneurship-and-enterprise-development-and-the-organization-for-development-of-small,-medium-and-
micro-enterprises, last accessed on 26.05.2018.  
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their country40. In addition to this, experts believe there is also a relatively high 
institutional capacity to tackle corruption across all administrative layers.  
Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC) is according to the 
national legislation an independent body. It has incorporated since 2013 the 
ombudsman office and its prerogatives to examine popular complaints and 
improve access to public information. It is an active representative in UNCAC 
and other international cooperation forums.  
Decentralisation Law passed in 201541 and Municipalities Law42 passed in 2017 
aimed at enhancing the executive powers of local governments in Jordan. Still, 
deprived of funding and without popular support for participation and 
representation at local level, the legislative provisions are still to give way to 
positive effects on local governance43.  
According to the National Action Plan for 2016-2018 assumed by Jordan as part 
of its participation in the Open Government Partnership, several measures to 
increase transparency and accountability at local level were undertaken, such as 
the involvement of CSOs in the assessment of the quality of information 
provided by governmental websites and recommend areas for improvement44. A 
multilateral team was established, comprising representatives of the Ministry of 
Public Service Development, Ministry of Telecommunication and 
representatives of RASED (monitoring programme on Accountability, Local 
Governance and Participation implemented by the Jordanian CSO Al Hayat). 
Experts also signaled one of the national reform programmes in education that 
had positive effects in the municipality of Al Salt. The Ministry of Education in 
Jordan implemented the School and District Development Programme (SDDP) 
which involved the development of Local Education Councils (LECs) which 
aim at bridging the divide between formal (i.e. school managers and 
representatives) and informal structures of power at local level.45 Given that 
                                           
40 Senate President Faisal Fayez declares the fight against corruption “top priority” for Jordan, December 10, 
2017, Jordan Times, [online] http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/fayez-says-fight-against-corruption-top-
priority-jordan, last accessed on 31.05.2018.  
41 OECD Open Government Review, Towards a New Partnership with Citizens: Jordan’s Decentralisation 
Reform, [online] https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/Jordan-Highlights-2017.pdf, last accessed on 
28.05.2018.   
42 MPs approve Municipalities Law, Jassar Al Tahat, April 09, 2017, The Jordan Times, [online] 
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/mps-approve-municipalities-law, last accessed on 28.05.2018.  
43Jordan’s Quest for Decentralization, Kirk Sowell, August 27, 2017, Carnegie Endowment, [online] 
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/72905, last accessed on 28.05.2018. 
44 Self-Assessment Report Jordan, Midterm Self-Assessment Report National Action Plan 2016-2018 October 
2017, https://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/Jordan_Mid-Term_Self-Assessment_2016-
2018.pdf, last accessed on 07.06.2018.  
45 The Seid Bin Haritha School in Al Salt municipality in Jordan in given as a benchmark example due to the 
implementation of the SDDP in Brixi, H., Lust, E., & Woolcock, M. (2015).  Trust, voice, and incentives: 
Learning from local success stories in service delivery in the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank 
Publications. 
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tribal authority still plays a big role in Jordanian communities, these 
mechanisms of involving all parties and making each other accountable for the 
quality of education at local level. 
 [Israel] 
In Israel, we can only assess the degree of institutional capacity at the local 
level, as the six regions have little to no prerogatives. In contrast, local 
authorities, be they municipalities, local or regional councils, have a much more 
important role in delivering public services. Nevertheless, these too are highly 
reliant on the central government due to budgetary constraints; while large 
municipalities have a higher share of own revenues, the smaller municipalities 
are much more constrained from a budgetary perspective.   
Small local authorities are different and there is much greater risk of nepotism 
and lack of transparency than in the case of bigger ones.  
Experts believe local and regional authorities in Israel to have a relatively high 
capacity to adequately deliver goods and services to citizens. This is in contrast 
with the other cases in this sample whose capacity was much lower. 
Furthermore, experts believe that political will to counter corruption is much 
higher at regional and local level, than at national level, albeit the latter is much 
better placed in terms of institutional resources to do so. 
Public procurement legislation is perceived to be strong, but experts point to the 
fact that certain procurement tenders can be designed in a manner which favors 
a particular winner. Sometimes public contracts are granted to relatives of the 
elected officials. Local experts also report close connections between 
developers and decision makers thus interfering in the planning of needs and 
technical assessments of the building processes. There is also a reported lenient 
enforcement of violations of environmental legislation. Still, there are also good 
examples of independent committees being set up for larger contracts at local 
and regional level, and formally there always have to be at least 3 competing 
offers, so there is some pressure from competitors on preferred suppliers. 
Furthermore, at local government levels, mayors and public officials involved in 
the selection process are personally liable for large fines for any improprieties in 
the public procurement process.  
Experts have reported the state-owned residences are granted preferentially to 
relatives of decision-makers or to people who pay bribes, and thus skip the 
usual selection process.  
Corrective measures are being implemented in Israel to counter corrupt 
practices in public procurement and other public concessions, as public officials 
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at local level are being arrested or dismissed for wrong doing46. Still, such 
efforts are coordinated by central authorities, require a lot of effort to trace the 
guilty parties at local and regional level, and are generally reliant on side 
investigations to those on corruption (e.g. Israeli Tax Authority investigations 
for fraud).  
Experts gave us examples of both preventive and corrective anticorruption 
measures. There is a relatively high level of disclosure of public information 
online, and new regulations (e.g. construction licensing) are generally being 
communicated to the interested parties. E-government is well developed in 
Israel, having the highest score for this set of cases in the UN E-government 
Survey47. Furthermore, some local authorities have open meetings, thus 
increasing citizens’ possibility to be informed on administrative actions.   
 [Turkey] 
According to the experts we interviewed, the main corruption problems at local 
level in Turkey are: favouritism in public procurement, nepotism and 
clientelistic distribution of public goods and/or services (see Table 1). These are 
all connected to a strategy of surviving in office, more than a strategy of rent-
seeking; as public resources are channeled through informal, rather than formal 
linkages, loyal supporters are rewarded and privileged. Indeed, as experts point 
out, public services at local level are frequently used in Turkey in a clientelistic 
manner, in exchange for political (e.g. participating at rallies) and electoral 
support. 
Experts point to the fact that private contractors with connections to the central 
government have gradually formed a cartel in sectors such as construction, 
transportation and infrastructure, and are frequent beneficiaries to contracts at 
LRA level too (e.g. bid for the third airport in Istanbul). Through personal 
connections with the central government such companies can facilitate 
budgetary transfers to cover their contracts.  
Other issues regarding public contracts at LRA level in Turkey is that they 
appear to be often granted to relatives of local public officials.  
In addition to this, the rent-seeking private contractors are also getting long 
terms loans with low interests from state banks to cover their engagement 
expenses.  
Overpricing public procurement on local urban infrastructure or landscaping is 
another problem signaled in our study. The overpricing of public works, 
delivery of poorer quality or fewer products than agreed upon in the contracts 
                                           
46 Senior Officials of Central Israeli City Arrested on Suspicion of Bribery, Aaron Rabinowitz and Josh Breiner, 
May 07, 2018, Haaretz, [online] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/senior-beit-shemesh-officials-arrested-on-
suspicion-of-bribery-1.6060900, last accessed on 29.05.2018.   
47 idem fn. 21. 
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have all been reported by the Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA). Similarly, 
experts consider there is a high level of unpredictability regarding local 
governments’ decisions and actions, as well as frequent regulatory and 
procedural changes. Another specific problem that was highlighted in our study 
is the speculation of urban lands based on the proprietary decision of local 
public officials.  
Overall, experts believe local and regional authorities in Turkey have a 
moderate capacity to adequately deliver goods and services to citizens. The 
survey we conducted also reflects a much higher political will to counter 
corruption at regional and local level, than at national level.   
One of the means of increasing the capacity of local governments in Turkey is 
the transfer of knowledge amongst peers. As such, an associative format, such 
as the Union of Municipalities of the Marmara Region (www.marmara.gov.tr) 
can offer such a platform for exchanges of good practices. Dominated by the 
city hall of Istanbul, the Union helps in the dissemination of projects in such 
areas as energy efficiency, in which local government have the investment 
decision power. Furthermore, they implement various courses for public 
officials designed to improve their administrative performance through the 
Local Government Academy (Yerel Yönetim Akademisi (YYA), 
www.yerelyonetimakademisi.com).   
Technical assistance projects have also paved the way to the acquisition of new 
competences at local and regional level. Such an example is the EU co-funded 
project “Local Investment Planning” that introduced a new way of planning and 
programming of local investments, focusing on a bottom-up approach48. The 
piloting phase of this project was implemented in Trabzon, Erzurun, and Mardin 
subregions.  
[Albania] 
In Albania, popular grievances regarding corruption are widespread. At the 
beginning of this year, large protests were mobilized on anti-corruption 
discourse. According to experts, at local level, the main forms of corruption 
Albania is facing are: favouritism in public procurement, and clientelistic 
distribution of public goods and/or services (see Table 1).  
According to a recent study from Open Procurement Albania, At least 10 
percent of tenders and contracts developed by municipalities across the country 
have problems of clientelism and favoritism49. Even if some of these contracts 
are not linked to corrupt behavior, the improprieties in legal and procedural 
                                           
48 http://www.vng-international.nl/blog/new-local-investment-planning-model-developed-in-turkey/, last 
accessed on 07.06.2018.  
49 10% of municipal tenders are awarded with clientelism [online] http://lapsi.al/2018/05/29/10-e-tenderave-te-
bashkive-jepen-me-klientelizem/, last accessed on 07.06.2018.   
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terms still signal out public procurement at municipal level in Albania. The 
NGO-driven initiative to monitor public procurements in Albania is 
www.open.data.al, where a list of all local public procurement procedures can 
be seen. This is a particularly useful method to increase transparency at local 
level, as any citizen can check if there are personal connections or undue private 
interests with regards to the winning contractors.   
Because of the widespread perception that the winner of public procurement 
contracts can only be selected based on personal deals, the competition is 
reduced, thus creating even less pressure to curb corruption.  
A widespread practice of extracting rents from public contracts is to give 
additional contracts of high value as annexes to an initial public procurement. 
These not only increase the lump sum allocated to a preferential contractor, but 
also fall outside public scrutiny, as generally no competitive procedure is 
required for such contracts.  
Indeed, the experts we interviewed mentioned that public procurement works 
are very often conditioned upon personal gains for officials in charge of 
implementing the bids. This is problematic, as it is often the political agent such 
as the mayor that get blamed for corruption, even if he or she was not 
necessarily involved in such proprietary dealings.  
On the other hand, experts also signal that sometimes it is the other way around, 
as it is the political actors that press upon civil servants to execute favorable 
decisions to political clients in public procurement proceedings. In the end, it is 
less important who is initiating the patronage relationship with private 
contractors, as it is the structural weakness of the procurement system in 
Albanian local authorities. It is the procedural faults that allow for discretionary 
decisions due to ambiguous legislative provisions, lack of clarity regarding 
eligibility criteria and overlapping elements in the selection procedures. 
In terms of public services, amongst the issue raised by experts were: 
conditional distribution of public services upon material gain on the part of 
clerical staff, increasing the value of a bureaucratic favor by long ques and 
difficult procedures of registration for public services, and delaying the 
distribution of certain goods (e.g. social housing) up until electoral periods, so 
that there can be political capitalisation.  
The experts’ assessment is that Albania’s local authorities have a moderate 
capacity to deliver qualitative public services to citizens. Like in many other 
countries in the Euro-Mediterranean area, regional authorities do not fulfill 
specific duties in service delivery, but rather act as representative agents of the 
central government and have a contribution in regional strategies for 
development since 2007. This means that local authorities are the main bodies 
of representation and service delivery at subnational level.  
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Recent legislative reforms on such issues as conflict of interests, obligation to 
publish a declaration of assets, or protection of whistle blowers are judged by 
experts to be relevant examples of good practices in Albania.  
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Prevalence of Corruption at the Local and Regional Level in 
Southern Mediterranean Countries: Cross-Country 
Comparisons 
Most prevalent forms of corruption in the Euro-Mediterranean area 
The main focus of our comparative assessment in this report are the Southern 
Mediterranean countries. However, in order to achieve a larger cross-country 
analysis, we included two other countries from the ARLEM network from the 
broader Euro-Mediterranean region. This gave us the important and useful 
perspective on structural challenges across different socio-political contexts.  
It is certain that the biggest problem at local and regional authorities level 
across the Euro-Mediterranean region is that of favoritism in public 
procurement. In a context in which resources are relatively scarce in subnational 
administrative units, corruption in public procurement procedures means a 
further dilution of the potential benefits that can reach the citizens. The only 
country in our sample of cases that does not seem to have major problems with 
favoritism in public procurement is Jordan. 
Table 1: The perception about the most prevalent forms of corruption in 
LRAs (%) 
EXPERT ASSESSMENT Morocco Tunisia Egypt Israel Jordan Turkey Albania BiH 
Favouritism in public 
procurement 
78 69 67 86 30 74 52 54 
Nepotism in appointing 
public officials 
56 50 33 57 40 58 43 54 
Abuse of power in public 
office 
33 31 83 29 52 47 30 62 
Decisions contrary to 
public interest 
22 38 25 14 43 21 35 46 
Conflicts of interest 44 31 75 71 34 21 9 8 
Clientelistic distribution of 
public goods 
78 63 50 29 9 58 52 23 
Note: The sum of percentages is greater than 100% because it was a multiple-choice question. Colour 
Scheme: Yellow < 25 (i.e. not very frequent problem), Orange 25-50 (i.e. relatively frequent problem), Red 50< 
(i.e. very frequent problem) 
The second largest problem across the region is nepotism in appointing public 
officials. Political patronage is usually deployed for one of two reasons (or 
both): to reward loyal supporters, or to better control the institutions in which 
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the appointees are employed50. If we look at the issues regarding public 
procurement and clientelistic distribution of public goods, we can see the need 
for such intermediaries in office. Still, it is often hard to discern how much 
nepotism is driven by the reward or by the control motivation. Most likely, in 
the Euro-Mediterranean region it is a mixture of both.  
In certain cases, lack of competence on the part of public officials, or 
ambiguous rules and procedures are reflected in such problems as nepotism or 
favoritism in assigning public contracts. However, as can be seen in the case of 
Morocco, Israel and Turkey, experts do not necessarily believe local and 
regional public officials are taking decisions that are contrary to public interest. 
Conflict of interests is an important concern in Egypt and Israel.  
Table 2: The perception about the main vulnerabilities of LRAs in 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT (%) 
Note: The sum of percentages is greater than 100% because it was a multiple-choice question. Colour 
Scheme: Yellow < 25 (i.e. not very frequent problem), Orange 25-50 (i.e. relatively frequent problem), Red 50< 
(i.e. very frequent problem) 
 
Lack of transparency is the main issue connected to public procurement 
procedures across the region. As seen above, this can be liked with the 
discretionary management of contracts so as to favor certain enterprises. 
According to experts, terms of reference (ToR) and bidding procedures are 
often rigged so as to ensure a favoured company wins. This distorts competition 
and usually decreases the quality of implementation; poor materials and delays 
are often accepted in order to increase the profit margins of the private 
contractors, thus increasing the rent margins as well.  
                                           
50 Kopecký, P., Mair, P., & Spirova, M. (Eds.). (2012). Party patronage and party government in European 
democracies. Oxford University Press. 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT Morocco Tunisia Egypt Israel Jordan Turkey Albania BiH 
Ambiguous legislation 27 31 25 29 17 37 22 31 
Lack of transparency 64 63 58 71 65 68 57 46 
Untrained personnel 45 50 33 43 30 11 39 38 
Poor protection for whistle 
blowers 
45 44 58 14 22 32 30 31 
Nepotism 27 25 50 71 43 68 43 54 
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Table 4: The perception about the main vulnerabilities of LRAs in the 
PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES (%) 
Note: The sum of percentages is greater than 100% because it was a multiple-choice question. Colour 
Scheme: Yellow < 25 (i.e. not very frequent problem), Orange 25-50 (i.e. relatively frequent problem), Red 50< 
(i.e. very frequent problem) 
Public services are generally plagued by conditional access. The discrimination 
based on personal connections or graft decreases the trust citizens have in their 
local and regional authorities’ ability to serve them. This in turn erodes the 
social contract and fuels larger disenchantment with the state and political elites. 
Lack of transparency is again the main issue with regards to public service 
delivery, as it is with regards to public procurement. The situation is slightly 
better in Israel, Turkey and Albania than in the rest of the countries. While 
clientelistic distribution of goods and services for electoral gains is largely 
connected with public service delivery in the region, this does not seem to be an 
issue for Jordan.  
Overall, in the larger Euro-Mediterranean area, we find that the lack of 
transparency, favouritism and nepotism are the main recurrent issues in 
different aspects of public functions at local and regional level.  
Overarching challenges in the Southern Mediterranean countries 
In some of the Southern Mediterranean countries analysed here, there are 
important overlaps between the challenges to achieving a higher quality of 
governance and the issues related to the quality of democracy and 
representation. In the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries where 
there were protests during the Arab Spring, there is a clear-cut connection 
between popular grievances regarding democracy and governance at the same 
PUBLIC SERVICES Morocco Tunisia Egypt Israel Jordan Turkey Albania BiH 
Abuse of administrative 
resources in electoral 
campaigns 
27 31 25 29 43 58 35 23 
Clientelistic distribution of 
public goods 
55 69 58 71 22 47 52 77 
Lack of transparency 64 56 75 43 65 37 48 62 
Nepotism 55 31 42 71 48 47 43 54 
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time. Empirical data shows that across MENA “perceptions about standards of 
living, labour market conditions, corruption and wasta are not only strongly 
associated with dissatisfaction with life prior to the Arab Spring, but also 
mentioned as one of the main reasons for the Arab Spring uprisings” 51. 
According to one of the experts we interviewed, in the region, “in public 
services you only have two options—either get very poor services or have to 
pay bribes to access others, and there is no use in complaining as there is no rule 
of law”. Essentially, the main side effect of the democratic and governmental 
failures in the region is a weak social contract, and citizens do not feel invested 
in formal structures of authority at local level.  
Graft Index is a measure of the proportion of instances firms are 
expected/requested to pay a gift or informal payment when applying for certain 
public services52. According to this metric, the graft levels are highest in 
Morocco and Turkey as they fall well above regional averages. In contrast, 
incidence of graft is not signalled as a major issue in Tunisia, Lebanon, or 
Jordan. In Israel graft appears to be a non-issue altogether for the private sector, 
as below 1% of the enterprises are expected to give gifts or bribes to get 
construction permits, or government contracts53.  
Subnational governance is often about “who rules whom” and “the allocation of 
authority” thus raising not only the issue of formal rules of power allocation, 
but also that of capacity to govern54. In many of the countries in the Southern 
Mediterranean area, the institutional capacity at local and regional level is weak 
(e.g. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco). Furthermore, a culture of civic participation and 
community involvement is largely absent (not only in electoral measures of 
turnout, but also in direct engagement with authorities and other public bodies). 
As such, LRAs ability to govern is very weak at the moment, in any sense of 
self- or even shared-rule. Nevertheless, LRAs have gradually taken on more and 
more duties through delegation from the central government which is likely to 
increase their impact on their local communities on the medium to long term. 
This enhancement of attributions for LRAs is essential to counterbalance the 
prevalence of informal networks of power at local level.   
                                           
51 Arampatzi, E., Burger,  M., Ianchovichina, E. , Rohricht, T.&  Veenhoven. R. (2015). “Unhappy 
Development: Dissatisfaction with Life on the Eve of the Arab Spring.” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 7488, World Bank, Washington, DC.. [online] https://personal.eur.nl/veenhoven/Pub2010s/2015x-
full.pdf, last accessed on 26.05.2018 
52 Based on Country Data from the Enterprise Survey conducted by the World Bank.  
53 Some of the experts consulted for the Israel case studies have however reported that there occurrences of 
giving bribes in exchange of licenses for opening a local businesses.  
54 Hooghe, L. &  Marks G.(2016). Community, Scale, and Regional Governance: A Postfunctionalist Theory of 
Governance: Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 7 Fiver Theses on Regional Governance, p. 
157.  
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In terms of outside solutions for LRA institutional capacity, technical assistance 
programs have had a very limited impact. This is because they are not properly 
integrated in the everyday practices of LRAs. There are notable exceptions of 
utility, such as the PNUD programme in Tunisia that contributed to the 
development of an Action Plan for the National Anticorruption Strategy, but 
overall, these efforts remain detached from the goals and functions of local 
communities. Without a stronger collaboration with existing administrative 
bodies who need to internalise in their processes the new tools and principles 
provided by assistance programmes efforts deployed by international donors  
may leave little behind in terms of palpable results.  
Given the various internal and regional challenges that the Southern 
Mediterranean countries are facing, there are various approaches the EU is 
engaging vis-à-vis these neighboring countries. Most of these efforts involve 
financial instruments. For example, the cross-border cooperation (CBC) 
programme allocated in between 2014 and 2020 a total of more than €200 
million55. More than €824 million are the estimated funding for the Regional 
South programme for 2014-202056. Within the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) the allocations are expected to be higher still on certain axes 
of cross-border cooperation.  
Beyond the lump financial engagement, there is a clear formulation of the need 
to engage with local and regional authorities (LRAs); often the main gain from 
international donors is knowledge transfer, not just financial assistance. This 
approach falls in line with the general theory on how increasing capacity at 
local level can significantly counter corruption and proprietary use of public 
resources57. As transparency is very low, so is public trust. International 
partners often suggest the development of performance-based accountability in 
the public administration at local level58. This would be an important step 
forward, as “a majority of MENA citizens routinely experience a cycle of poor 
performance in their daily lives: political, administrative, and social institutions 
fail to instill adequate accountability (…) as citizens experience poor service 
quality, they increasingly regard the government as corrupt and ineffective”59.  
                                           
55 €209,057,812 divided equally between ENI funding and ERDF funding, in addition to which there was also a 
total of €33,354,820 available through the “Sea Crossing Programme” between Italy and Tunisia in the period 
2014-2020. For further details see programming document for EU support to ENI Cross-Border Cooperation 
(2014-2020). 
56 https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/policy, last accessed on 27.04.2018 
57 Ivanyna, M., & Shah, A. (2011). Decentralization and corruption: new cross-country evidence. Environment 
and Planning C: Government and Policy, 29(2), 344-362. Of course, there also is a counter-trend in the 
literature that argues there is a positive relation between decentralisation and prevalence of corruption (see for 
example review in Faguet, J. P. (2012). Decentralization and popular democracy: Governance from below in 
Bolivia. University of Michigan Press. p.166), but it assumes there is an inevitably poorer institutional capacity 
at local level. 
58 Shah, A. (Ed.). (2007). Performance accountability and combating corruption. World Bank Publications. 
59 Brixi, et al (2015) see fn 44. 
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A second line of dialogue between LRAs in Southern Mediterranean and EU is 
the economic agenda. Ever since the Barcelona Process, economic development 
is a central objective for the countries in the region and it is seen as the main 
area where the EU should play a role, according to ArabTrans surveys; 
Morocco scores highest in the region in its expectations for positive economic 
effects of EU programmes60. Furthermore, economic development is inherently 
reliant upon market reforms which are in turn reliant on non-discriminatory 
governance and bureaucracy. As such, economic development measures can 
hardly be separated from efforts to improve institutional capacity at local and 
regional levels. Foreign investment and local entrepreneurship is severely 
affected by the salient informalism of the Southern Mediterranean countries.  
Finally, the fundamental dialogue that should be maintained between the EU 
and the countries in this region is the design of the balance of power. Local self-
rule or self-governance cannot work in the absence of fiscal collection capacity–
as LRAs cannot raise money from local investments, they do not have own 
revenues. In MENA only very small percentage of public expenditures are done 
at local level. As such, even there would gradually be achieved a higher 
autonomy, they would still not have the means to do a lot. By shifting decision-
making and necessary tools (e.g. financial resources) to the local level, public 
services will be delivered at a better quality and there will be higher popular 
support. If things are deficient people will hold local leaders accountable 
through electoral outcomes, thus avoiding larger tensions and frustrations 
building up. 
                                           
60 ArabTrans project, WP9 D9.26: The Impact of the European Union in Arab Countries and the impact of the 
Arab transformations upon the EU, p. 91.   
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Policy Recommendations for Strengthening the Institutional 
Capacity of Local and Regional Authorities Southern 
Mediterranean Countries 
Some of the recommendations in this section have been informed by the best 
practices observed and discussed with regional experts during the data 
collection process of this study. The rest of the recommendations here have 
been emerge from a previous similar study in Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
countries61 and from further desk research on recent innovative best practices in 
terms of transparency and corruption prevention worldwide.62 The goal of this 
section is not so much to prescribe very specific lines of action as it is to offer 
an overview of different options available, as well as some principles, standards 
and tools LRAs may want to explore in the area of corruption prevention.  
International benchmarks to be pursued at subnational level 
The development of national, regional or local Right to Information (RTI) 
legislation, may stimulate the emergence of civil society portals. These portals 
can play a positive role in improving the overall RTI environment, by 
increasing efficiency and automatisation of RTI requests, improving overall the 
understanding of RTI and offering a more user-friendly service. These civil 
society portals tend to be more use plain language, provide additional guidance 
for end users, encourage citizens to look for existing information, collect the 
necessary email addresses of public officials, and provide financial and 
administrative backing in case of appeal processes.63  
These portals have become key instruments and supported the work and 
emergence of transparency advocates in countries such as Chile, Germany, New 
Zealand, and Uruguay. They could help develop a supporting dialogue between 
NGOs and governments concerning RTI, and therefore contribute to an 
increased transparency culture and to prevent corruption. In the Philippines for 
example, the government disclosed spending for roads and schools online, 
frequently geo-coded to identify exact locations, thus allowing civil society and 
citizens to give feedback to see if these roads existed; the Commission of Audit 
integrated social audits, mandating government response, and reportedly saved 
                                           
61 Volintiru et al (2017). Preventing Corruption and Promoting Public Ethics at the Local and Regional Level in 
Eastern Partnership Countries. Committee of Regions Report, [online]  
https://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/studies/Documents/Preventing-Corruption.pdf, last accessed on 
16.06.2018. 
62 This part of the study has been conducted with the expert guidance of Dr Fabrizio Scrollini, the Executive 
Director of Latin American Open Data Initiative (ILDA) and member of the Open Data Network for 
Development (OD4D). 
63 Bailur, S. & Longley, T. (2014). Research into mySociety’s online Freedom of Information platform, 
Alaveteli. mySociety Research. [online] http://research.mysociety.org/publications/mysocietys-online-freedom-
of-information-platform, last accessed on 16.06.2018. 
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$300,000 per ghost road64. However, it is important to understand the specific 
context and how portals would interact with existing institutions, to what extent 
external funding is necessary to their operations, and adjust expectations as they 
are not immediate game changers.65 In Mongolia, citizens were trained to fill 
out community score cards on 84 different public services, followed by dialogue 
with government, which then took actions to improve access to water and 
sanitation in response to citizen feedback, closing the feedback loop.   
Open data initiatives also have potential to create positive dialogue between 
civil society and government on transparency and accountability. Reliable 
evidence on the impact of government led open data initiatives, in particular in 
developing countries has been scarce. However, public availability of certain 
data, according to experts, can empower those civil servants that oppose 
corruption, without having to turn them directly into whistle blowers. When 
knowing that information about their actions will be made public or accessible 
to other civil servants, officials are encouraged to behave better, even without 
the exercise of accountability mechanisms. Moreover, when designing open 
data systems as well as their evaluation, it is important to pay attention to its 
specific locality or sector. 66  Exploring and tailoring an open data policy in a 
specific governance setting such as public procurement could be fruitful 
regardless of the level of progress in the global open data agenda in the country.  
Open contracting and collaboration across agencies could prove very useful in 
halting corruption. For instance, in Bogota a collective effort between the city’s 
education secretariat with other government and business enabled a radical 
reform in the US$170 million provision of school meals. They transitioned from 
a highly problematic direct contracting system to an open contracting one, 
improving the service, reducing the ground for corruption and making savings 
estimated at 10-15%.67 Even in the case that a full-fledge initiative could be 
difficult to implement, introducing some of the principles of open contracting68 
and developing data standards69 and guides on what data on public procurement 
must be available to the public and how these data must be shared can be a 
                                           
64 https://www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/joining-forces-empower-serve-citizens-tale-of-two-partnerships-
gpsa-ogp, last accessed on 07.06.2018. 
65 Fumega, S. & Scrollini, F. (2018). Exploring the role of digital civil society portal in improving Right to 
Information regimes. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2008 (1). [online] 
https://www.u4.no/publications/exploring-the-role-of-digital-civil-society-portals-in-improving-right-to-
information-regimes/pdf, last accessed on 07.06.2018. 
66 Davies, T., & Perini, F. (2016). Researching the emerging impacts of open data: revisiting the ODDC 
conceptual framework. The Journal of Community Informatics, 12(2). 
67 Open Contracting (2018). The deals behind the meals: How open contracting helped fix Colombia’s biggest 
school meal program’ [online]: https://medium.com/open-contracting-stories/the-deals-behind-the-meals-
c4592e9466a2, last accessed on 07.06.2018. 
68 See for instance Open Contracting Partnership’s Global Principles [online]  https://www.open-
contracting.org/implement/global-principles/ , last accessed on 07.06.2018. 
69 The Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) is considered best practice for open data in this context 
http://standard.open-contracting.org/latest/en/ , last accessed on 07.06.2018. 
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positive step in corruption prevention. In parallel these governments may want 
to work at different level (local, regional and national) to help civil society 
develop the capacity to monitor open contracts. The Spanish independent 
organisation Civio (Fundación Ciudadana Civio) 70 provides an example of how 
civil society can contribute to reduce opacity and detect irregularities in public 
procurement. In Ukraine, reformers from government and civil society joined 
forces to launch the open contracting platform ProZorro, through which all 
contracts are disclosed under open data standards, so they are searchable by the 
public; this has reportedly brought about fiscal savings of over $1 billion in two 
years, and are currently trying to implement an updated version of the platform 
(i.e. DoZorro) where citizens can track the implementation of contracts, report 
problems, and track government response71. 
Advancing in fiscal transparency can also be a way to improve how public 
resources are utilized at local and regional level. Some of the principles 
promoted by The Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT)72 at national 
level could be implemented by municipalities and regional governments to curb 
corruption.73 For instance, LRAs should clearly communicate the objectives 
they pursue and the outputs they are producing with the resources devoted to 
them, in an effort to disclose the expected social, economic and environmental 
outcomes of their policies. Roles and responsibilities for the management of 
public resources should be clearly allocated in legislation between the national 
and subnational levels of government. Auditors should have statutory 
independence from the governments which actions they are scrutinising, as well 
as the appropriate legal mandate and resources. Their actions should also be 
subject to the principles of accountability and transparency. Tools such as those 
developed by the initiative OpenBudgets.eu74 or The World Bank75 may 
facilitate the work of those public administrations and NGOs willing to pursue 
the fiscal transparency agenda as a means to reduce corruption. 
LRAs could test their more ambitious transparency and accountability 
initiatives first in a particularly problematic sector, such as licensing of 
extractive industries (e.g. EITI standard), publicly funded construction or 
garbage collection. Similarly, since public procurement is usually the 
                                           
70 https://civio.es/en/ , last accessed on 07.06.2018. 
71 idem fn. 59. 
72 GIFT (2018) ‘Detailed Explanation of High-Level Principles’ http://www.fiscaltransparency.net/expanded-
version/  , last accessed on 07.06.2018. 
73 See for instance, the Argentinian experiment GastoPublicoBahiense.org which published from 2010 to 2016 
public procurement data from the Bahía Blanca municipality. http://blog.jazzido.com/2010/07/18/un-
experimento-sobre-tecnologia-y-transparencia-gubernamental/ , last accessed on 07.06.2018. 
74 http://openbudgets.eu/tools/ , last accessed on 07.06.2018. 
75 http://boost.worldbank.org/tools-resources/topics/promoting-open-budgets/fiscal-transparency , last accessed 
on 07.06.2018. 
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government activity most vulnerable to corruption,76 LRAs may want to 
concentrate their anti-corruption capacity building efforts in it. There are 
abundant integrity risks in each of the stages of the public procurement cycle, 
pre-tendering, tendering and post award phases. The anti-corruption strategy for 
public procurement in these countries should set organisational procedures, 
integrate anti-corruption measures in workday life, work on raising awareness 
of officials at all levels in prevention and on its consequences, as well as follow 
an active process of re-assessment for a continuous improvement.77  
Benchmarks and lessons learned from the Southern Periphery region 
 
Good practice examples: 
 The legislative reform (i.e. Municipalities Law, Decentralisation Law) 
coupled with community-centered projects (e.g. SDDP) can yield 
gains in the quality of governance and service provision at local level, but 
as Jordan shows this is a long-term process that is reliant on changes in 
mentality as much as it is on political will.  
 The capacity to counter corruption requires both institutional and 
legislative instruments. Both the institutional setting (i.e. INLUCC, 
INAI) and the anticorruption legislation (i.e. National Anticorruption 
Strategy, RTI Law) have checked boxes for good practices in Tunisia. 
The strength of its dedicated Anticorruption Agency as opposed to others 
in the region is that the goals and objectives states in the National 
Strategy are backed up by a specific action plan for the short term (i.e. 
2017-2018) which makes activities as well as results much more easily 
traceable by third parties.   
 Transparency and public trust increase simultaneously as access to 
public information is granted freely to citizens. Morocco recently 
adopted a new law regulating access to public information, after joining 
the Open Government Partnership (OGP). Similarly, as part of the 
commitments taken within the OGP, Jordan has been implementing a 
series of reforms aimed at increasing e-governance, public participation 
and enhancing the quality of public service delivery78. As part of its OGP 
commitments, Tunisia too implemented a series of reforms in local 
                                           
76 OECD (2016) .Preventing Corruption in Public Procurement. OECD Better Policies For Better Lives Report. 
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/Corruption-Public-Procurement-Brochure.pdf last accessed on 
07.06.2018. 
77 See for instance the Anti-Corruption Strategy of the Austrian Federal Procurement Agency 
https://www.bbg.gv.at/english/about-the-fpa/. last accessed on 07.06.2018.   
78 https://www.opengovpartnership.org/countries/jordan, last accessed on 07.06.2018.   
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governance in collaboration with citizens and civil society79. A series of 
governmental online portals in Egypt also further the accessibility of 
public services, while limiting the opportunities for graft or preferential 
treatment.   
 A way to scale up benchmark examples is by creating the 
environment for exchanges of good practices. Professional associations 
such as the Municipalities Union of Marmara in Turkey allow for this to 
happen. Dedicated training sessions for public officials from different 
LRAs are another example from Turkey that can further communication 
and knowledge transfers (e.g. Local Government Academy (Yerel 
Yönetim Akademisi (YYA). Initiatives that are led by the Central 
Government can be effective as well, as shown in Egypt by the case of 
the Participatory Development Programme in Urban Areas (PDP) 
(http://egypt-urban.net). There are also other relevant bodies that promote 
the exchange of knowledge at international level, such as the Arab 
Administrative Development Organization (ARADO) (www.arado.org), 
or Open Government Partnership (OGP) (www.opengovpartnership.org). 
International donors such as OECD, EU, UN, or the World Bank are 
frequently supporting such initiatives. 
 Bottom-up initiatives are often more easily adopted and legitimised 
by local communities. A good example in Egypt is the one-stop shops 
for business start-ups: The Egyptian Center for Public Policy Studies 
seeks to empower entrepreneurs through the telephone application 
‘Mashro3y’ launched by the Egyptian Center in cooperation with the 
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cairo. The main 
objective of this application is to provide information about financial and 
non-financial service providers to individuals wishing to establish an 
economic activity and already existing entrepreneurs. The Center sought 
to spread this application in the Egyptian governorates through several 
conferences and seminars, which raised the number of ‘Mashro3y’ users 
to 25 thousand users in 27 Egyptian governorates. 80 
 
 
 
                                           
79 https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/tunisia-second-national-action-plan-2016-2018, last accessed 
on 07.06.2018. 
80 Egyptian Center for Public Policy Studies (ECPPS) (2017) Policy Paper Series: Reforming the Business 
Climate and micro, small and medium sized enterprises in Egypt, [online] 
http://ecpps.org/attachments/article/1328/Information%20centers%20and%20the%20digital.pdf  last accessed 
on 07.06.2018. 
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Suggestions based on identified country-specific problems: 
 Use electronic systems for the selection of beneficiaries of certain public 
services that are more prone to being exchanged preferentially 
(suggestion from Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) 
 Independent control system for Local and Regional authorities or certain 
key functions they perform in public procurement and service delivery 
(suggestion from Turkey) 
 Surveillance cameras on administrative offices that engage with the 
public on a day-to-day basis so as to diminish petty corruption 
(suggestion from Morocco) 
 Public employees training on ethical conduct and countering measures for 
corruption (e.g. whistle blowing) (suggestion from Tunisia and Egypt) 
 Participatory budgeting at local level (suggestion from Tunisia and 
Turkey) 
 Open council and other deliberative meetings at LRA level (suggestion 
from Israel) 
 Raise awareness amongst citizens and local NGOs about the causes, 
forms and effects of corruption through dedicated campaigns (suggestion 
from Israel) 
 Third party (e.g. NGO) monitoring of tenders and public spending at 
local level (suggestion from Turkey) 
 
Further recommendations:  
 Anti-corruption authorities should be partners to local and regional 
authorities in ensuring good governance, especially in terms of putting in 
place preventive measures that can help promote good practices (e.g. 
transparency, digitalisation), rather than punish unethical behavior. In the 
sample of cases analyzed here, only Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Bosnia 
and Hertzegovina have stand alone, specialised institutions in preventing 
corruption (see Annex 2). It is important to have distinctive authorities in 
charge of prevention, to ensure their independence and impartial conduct, 
but also to develop new collaborations across governmental levels. 
  Digitalisation strategies in LRAs should focus as much on transparency, 
and accessibility, as on ensuring participatory interactions with users. 
This “co-design” or “co-production” of public services and policies81 
                                           
81 See OECD recommendations for digitalisation strategies in MENA, 2017 [online] 
https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/digital-governance-mena.pdf, last accessed on 07.06.2018.  
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would increase citizens’ ownership over community issues, the 
legitimacy of the state, and consolidate their trust in LRAs.   
 In order for local authorities to be able to make a meaningful difference, 
local budgets should be increased, encouraging the development of fiscal 
collection capacity from investments and development projects, and 
asserting ownership over the quality of goods and services provided.  
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Annex 1. Prioritisation Matrix for Corruption 
Problems in the EU Periphery 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: present expert survey for South Med countries; Volintiru et al (2017) for input on EaP countries; Tromme and Volintiru (2018) for input on EU. 
 
Prioritisation Matrix 
scale (1-6) 
South Med 
countries 
European 
Union 
Eastern 
Partnership 
(EaP) 
Transparency; 1 5 1 
Conflicts of interest and 
clientelism; 
4 3 3 
Protecting whistleblowers; 5 6 6 
Nepotism (recruitment of 
staff); 
3 4 2 
Public procurement; 2 1 5 
Abuse of administrative 
resources in election 
campaigns; 
6 2 4 
    
Transparency
Conflicts of interest
and clientelism
Protecting
whistleblowers
Nepotism
(recruitment of staff)
Public procurement
Abuse of
administrative
resources in election
campaigns
European Union Eastern Partnership (EaP) South Med countries
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  Main Problems in Public Procurement Main Problems in Public Service Delivery 
Morocco 
Lack of transparency Lack of transparency 
Untrained personnel Nepotism 
Poor or non-existent protection for whistle blowers Clientelistic distribution of goods and services 
Tunisia 
Lack of transparency Clientelistic distribution of goods and services 
Untrained personnel Nepotism 
Poor or non-existent protection for whistle blowers 
 
Egypt 
Lack of transparency Lack of transparency 
Poor or non-existent protection for whistle blowers Clientelistic distribution of goods and services 
Nepotism 
 
Israel 
Lack of transparency Clientelistic distribution of goods and services 
Nepotism Nepotism 
Jordan 
Lack of transparency Lack of transparency 
Nepotism Nepotism 
Turkey 
Lack of transparency Abuse of administrative resources in electoral campaigns 
Nepotism Clientelistic distribution of goods and services 
 Nepotism 
Albania 
Lack of transparency Clientelistic distribution of goods and services 
Nepotism Lack of transparency 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Nepotism Clientelistic distribution of goods and services 
Lack of transparency Lack of transparency 
Source: Based on original expert survey conducted for this study
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Annex 2. National anti-corruption bodies 
Source: UNODC 
COUNTRY 
ASSET RECOVERY 
FOCAL POINT 
CENTRAL 
AUTHORITY FOR 
MUTUAL LEGAL 
ASSISTANCE 
PREVENTION 
AUTHORITY 
MOROCCO n.a. 
General Direction for 
Criminal Affairs- 
Ministry of Justice 
Central Body for the 
Prevention of Corruption 
(ICPC)  
TUNISIA General Direction for Criminal Affairs- Ministry of Justice 
EGYPT 
International 
Cooperation Office of 
the Prosecutor General's 
Office 
Ministry of Justice, 
Office of the Assistant 
Minister of Justice for 
International and 
Cultural Cooperation 
Administrative Control 
Authority (ACA) 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Anti Corruption 
JORDAN Anti-Corruption 
Commission 
Mutual Legal Assistance 
Requests Service, 
Ministry of Justice, 
International Relations 
Directorate 
Anti-Corruption 
Commission 
ISRAEL 
National Forfeiture 
Unit, Israel Police 
Department of International Affairs, Office of the 
State Attorney, 
Ministry of Justice 
ALBANIA n.a. 
The General 
Prosecutor’s Office  
Ministry of Justice 
Department of the 
Internal Audit and Anti-
Corruption, Council of 
Ministers 
BOSNIA AND 
HERTZEGOVINA 
Ministry of Justice n.a. 
Agency for the 
Prevention of Corruption 
and Coordination of the 
Fight against Corruption 
(APIK) 
